# Theta functions and applications in cryptography Fonctions thêta et applications en cryptographie Thèse d'informatique 

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## Outline

(1) Public-key cryptography
(2) Abelian varieties
(3) Theta functions
(4) Pairings
(5) Isogenies
(6) Perspectives

## Outline

(1) Public-key cryptography

## Abelian varieties

## Theta functions

4 Pairings
(5) Isogenies

6 Perspectives

## A brief history of public-key cryptography

- Secret-key cryptography: Vigenère (1553), One time pad (1917), AES (NIST, 2001).
- Public-key cryptography:
- Diffie-Hellman key exchange (1976).
- RSA (1978): multiplication/factorisation.
- ElGamal: exponentiation/discrete logarithm in $G=\mathbb{F}_{q}^{*}$.
- ECC/HECC (1985): discrete logarithm in $G=A\left(\mathbb{F}_{q}\right)$.
- Lattices, NTRU (1996), Ideal Lattices (2006): perturbate a lattice point/Closest Vector Problem, Bounded Distance Decoding.
- Polynomial systems, HFE (1996): evaluating polynomials/finding roots.
- Coding-based cryptography, McEliece (1978): Matrix.vector/decoding a linear code.
$\Rightarrow$ Encryption, Signature (+Pseudo Random Number Generator, Zero Knowledge).
- Pairing-based cryptography (2000-2001).
- Homomorphic cryptography (2009).


## RSA versus (H)ECC

| Security <br> (bits level) | RSA | ECC |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 72 | 1008 | 144 |
| 80 | 1248 | 160 |
| 96 | 1776 | 192 |
| 112 | 2432 | 224 |
| 128 | 3248 | 256 |
| 256 | 15424 | 512 |

Key length comparison between RSA and ECC

- Factorisation of a 768-bit RSA modulus [Kle+1o].
- Currently: attempt to attack a 130-bit Koblitz elliptic curve.


## Discrete logarithm

## Definition (DLP)

Let $G=\langle g\rangle$ be a cyclic group of prime order. Let $x \in \mathbb{N}$ and $h=g^{x}$. The discrete logarithm $\log _{g}(h)$ is $x$.

- Exponentiation: $O(\log p)$. DLP: $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{p})$ (in a generic group).
- $G=\mathbb{F}_{p}^{*}$ : sub-exponential attacks.
$\Rightarrow$ Find secure groups with efficient law, compact representation.


## Protocol [Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange]

Alice sends $g^{a}$, Bob sends $g^{b}$, the common key is

$$
g^{a b}=\left(g^{b}\right)^{a}=\left(g^{a}\right)^{b}
$$

## Pairing-based cryptography

## Definition

A pairing is a bilinear application $e: G_{1} \times G_{1} \rightarrow G_{2}$.

- Identity-based cryptography [BFo3].
- Short signature [BLSo4].
- One way tripartite Diffie-Hellman [Jouo4].
- Self-blindable credential certificates [Vero1].
- Attribute based cryptography [SW05].
- Broadcast encryption [Goy+o6].


## Tripartite Diffie-Helman

Alice sends $g^{a}$, Bob sends $g^{b}$, Charlie sends $g^{c}$. The common key is

$$
e(g, g)^{a b c}=e\left(g^{b}, g^{c}\right)^{a}=e\left(g^{c}, g^{a}\right)^{b}=e\left(g^{a}, g^{b}\right)^{c} \in G_{2} .
$$

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## Abelian varieties

## Definition

An Abelian variety is a complete connected group variety over a base field $k$.

- Abelian variety = points on a projective space (locus of homogeneous polynomials) + an abelian group law given by rational functions.
$\Rightarrow$ Use $G=A(k)$ with $k=\mathbb{F}_{q}$ for the DLP.
$\Rightarrow$ Pairing-based cryptography with the Weil or Tate pairing. (Only available on abelian varieties.)


## Elliptic curves

## Definition ( $\operatorname{car} k \neq 2,3$ )

$E: y^{2}=x^{3}+a x+b . \quad 4 a^{3}+27 b^{2} \neq 0$.

- An elliptic curve is a plane curve of genus 1 .
- Elliptic curves = Abelian varieties of dimension 1.


$$
\begin{gathered}
P+Q=-R=\left(x_{R},-y_{R}\right) \\
\lambda=\frac{y_{Q}-y_{P}}{x_{Q}-x_{P}} \\
x_{R}=\lambda^{2}-x_{P}-x_{Q} \\
y_{R}=y_{P}+\lambda\left(x_{R}-x_{P}\right)
\end{gathered}
$$

## Jacobian of hyperelliptic curves

$C: y^{2}=f(x)$, hyperelliptic curve of genus $g . \quad(\operatorname{deg} f=2 g-1)$

- Divisor: formal sum $D=\sum n_{i} P_{i}, \quad P_{i} \in C(\bar{k})$. $\operatorname{deg} D=\sum n_{i}$.
- Principal divisor: $\sum_{P \in C(\bar{k})} v_{P}(f) . P ; \quad f \in \bar{k}(C)$.
- Jacobian of $C=$ Divisors of degree 0 modulo principal divisors

$$
=\text { Abelian variety of dimension } g \text {. }
$$

- Divisor class $D \Rightarrow$ unique representative (Riemann-Roch):

$$
D=\sum_{i=1}^{k}\left(P_{i}-P_{\infty}\right) \quad k \leqslant g, \quad \text { symmetric } P_{i} \neq P_{j}
$$

- Mumford coordinates: $D=(u, v) \Rightarrow u=\Pi\left(x-x_{i}\right), v\left(x_{i}\right)=y_{i}$.
- Cantor algorithm: addition law.


## Example of the addition law in genus 2

$$
\begin{aligned}
& D=P_{1}+P_{2}-2 \infty \\
& D^{\prime}=Q_{1}+Q_{2}-2 \infty
\end{aligned}
$$



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## Example of the addition law in genus 2



## Security of Jacobians

| $g$ | \# points | DLP |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | $O(q)$ | $\widetilde{O}\left(q^{1 / 2}\right)$ |
| 2 | $O\left(q^{2}\right)$ | $\widetilde{O}(q)$ |
| 3 | $O\left(q^{3}\right)$ | $\widetilde{O}\left(q^{4 / 3}\right)$ (Jacobian of hyperelliptic curve) <br> $\widetilde{O}(q) \quad$ (Jacobian of non hyperelliptic curve) |
| $\stackrel{g}{g>\log (q)}$ | $O\left(q^{g}\right)$ | $\begin{aligned} & \widetilde{O}\left(q^{2-2 / g}\right) \\ & L_{1 / 2}\left(q^{g}\right)=\exp \left(O(1) \log (x)^{1 / 2} \log \log (x)^{1 / 2}\right) \end{aligned}$ |

- Weak curves (MOV attack, Weil descent, anomal curves).
$\Rightarrow$ Public-key cryptography with the DLP: Elliptic curves, Jacobian of hyperelliptic curves of genus 2.
$\Rightarrow$ Pairing-based cryptography: Abelian varieties of dimension $g \leqslant 4$.


## Security of Jacobians

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| $(q) \quad$ (Jacobian of non hyperelliptic curve) |  |  |
| $g$ | $O\left(q^{g}\right)$ | $\widetilde{O}\left(q^{2-2 / g}\right)$ |
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## Tsogenies

## Definition

A (separable) isogeny is a finite surjective (separable) morphism between two Abelian varieties.

- Isogenies $=$ Rational map + group morphism + finite kernel.
- Isogenies $\Leftrightarrow$ Finite subgroups.

$$
\begin{aligned}
& (f: A \rightarrow B) \mapsto \operatorname{Ker} f \\
& (A \rightarrow A / H) \leftrightarrow H
\end{aligned}
$$

- Example: Multiplication by $\ell(\Rightarrow \ell$-torsion), Frobenius (non separable).


## Cryptographic usage of isogenies

- Transfer the DLP from one Abelian variety to another.
- Point counting algorithms ( $\ell$-adic or $p$-adic) $\Rightarrow$ Verify a curve is secure.
- Compute the class field polynomials (CM-method) $\Rightarrow$ Construct a secure curve.
- Compute the modular polynomials $\Rightarrow$ Compute isogenies.
- Determine $\operatorname{End}(A) \Rightarrow$ CRT method for class field polynomials.


## Vélu's formula

## Theorem

Let $E: y^{2}=f(x)$ be an elliptic curve and $G \subset E(k)$ a finite subgroup. Then $E / G$ is given by $Y^{2}=g(X)$ where

$$
\begin{aligned}
& X(P)=x(P)+\sum_{Q \in G \backslash\left\{0_{E}\right\}}(x(P+Q)-x(Q)) \\
& Y(P)=y(P)+\sum_{Q \in G \backslash\left\{0_{E}\right\}}(y(P+Q)-y(Q)) .
\end{aligned}
$$

- Uses the fact that $x$ and $y$ are characterised in $k(E)$ by

$$
\begin{array}{rlr}
v_{0_{E}}(x)=-2 & v_{P}(x) \geqslant 0 & \text { if } P \neq 0_{E} \\
v_{0_{E}}(y)=-3 & v_{P}(y) \geqslant 0 & \text { if } P \neq 0_{E} \\
y^{2} / x^{3}\left(0_{E}\right)=1 & &
\end{array}
$$

- No such characterisation in genus $g \geqslant 2$.


## The modular polynomial

## Definition

- Modular polynomial $\phi_{n}(x, y) \in \mathbb{Z}[x, y]: \phi_{n}(x, y)=0 \Leftrightarrow x=j(E)$ and $y=j\left(E^{\prime}\right)$ with $E$ and $E^{\prime} n$-isogeneous.
- If $E: y^{2}=x^{3}+a x+b$ is an elliptic curve, the $j$-invariant is

$$
j(E)=1728 \frac{4 a^{3}}{4 a^{3}+27 b^{2}}
$$

- Roots of $\phi_{n}(j(E),.) \Leftrightarrow$ elliptic curves $n$-isogeneous to $E$.
- In genus 2, modular polynomials use Igusa invariants. The height explodes.
$\Rightarrow$ Genus 2: $(2,2)$-isogenies [Richelot]. Genus 3: $(2,2,2)$-isogenies [Smio9].
$\Rightarrow$ Moduli space given by invariants with more structure.
$\Rightarrow$ Fix the form of the isogeny and look for compatible coordinates.


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## Complex abelian varieties and theta functions of level $n$

- $\left(\mathcal{\vartheta}_{i}\right)_{i \in Z(\bar{n})}$ : basis of the theta functions of level $n$. $\left(Z(\bar{n}):=\mathbb{Z}^{9} / n \mathbb{Z}^{9}\right)$
$\Leftrightarrow A[n]=A_{1}[n] \oplus A_{2}[n]:$ symplectic decomposition.
- $\left(\vartheta_{i}\right)_{i \in Z(\bar{n})}= \begin{cases}\text { coordinates system } & n \geqslant 3 \\ \text { coordinates on the Kummer variety } A / \pm 1 & n=2\end{cases}$
- Theta null point: $\mathcal{Y}_{i}(0)_{i \in Z(\bar{n})}=$ modular invariant.


## Example $(k=\mathbb{C})$

Abelian variety over $\mathbb{C}: A=\mathbb{C}^{g} /\left(\mathbb{Z}^{g}+\Omega \mathbb{Z}^{g}\right) ; \Omega \in \mathcal{H}_{g}(\mathbb{C})$ the Siegel upper half space $(\Omega$ symmetric, $\operatorname{Im} \Omega$ positive definite).

$$
\mathcal{\vartheta}_{i}:=\Theta\left[\begin{array}{c}
0 \\
i / n
\end{array}\right](z, \Omega / n) .
$$

## The differential addition law $(k=\mathbb{C})$

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\left(\sum_{t \in Z(\overline{2})} \chi(t) \vartheta_{i+t}(x+y) \vartheta_{j+t}(x-y)\right) \cdot\left(\sum_{t \in Z(\overline{2})} \chi(t) \vartheta_{k+t}(0) \vartheta_{l+t}(0)\right)= \\
&\left(\sum_{t \in Z(\overline{2})} \chi(t) \vartheta_{-i^{\prime}+t}(y) \vartheta_{j^{\prime}+t}(y)\right) \cdot\left(\sum_{t \in Z(\overline{2})} \chi(t) \vartheta_{k^{\prime}+t}(x) \vartheta_{l^{\prime}+t}(x)\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { where } \quad \chi \in \hat{Z}(\overline{2}), i, j, k, l \in Z(\bar{n}) \\
& \qquad\left(i^{\prime}, j^{\prime}, k^{\prime}, l^{\prime}\right)=A(i, j, k, l) \\
& A=\frac{1}{2}\left(\begin{array}{cccc}
1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
1 & 1 & -1 & -1 \\
1 & -1 & 1 & -1 \\
1 & -1 & -1 & 1
\end{array}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

## Arithmetic with low level theta functions ( $\operatorname{car} k \neq 2$ )

|  | Mumford | Level 2 | Level 4 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | [Lano5] | [Gauo7] |  |
| Doubling | $34 M+7 S$ | $7 M+12 S+9 m_{0}$ | $49 M+36 S+27 m_{0}$ |
| Mixed Addition | $37 M+6 S$ |  |  |

Multiplication cost in genus 2 (one step).
$\left.\begin{array}{lcccc}\hline & \text { Montgomery } & \text { Level 2 } & \text { Jacobians } & \text { Level 4 } \\ \text { Doubling } & 5 M+4 S+1 m_{0} & 3 M+6 S+3 m_{0} & 3 M+5 S & 7 M+6 S+1 m_{0}\end{array}\right) 9 M+10 S+5 m_{0} \quad$.

Multiplication cost in genus 1 (one step).

## Arithmetic with high level theta functions [L Rioa]

- Algorithms for
- Additions and differential additions in level 4.
- Computing $P \pm Q$ in level 2 (need one square root). [LRiob]
- Fast differential multiplication.
- Compressing coordinates $O(1)$ :
- Level $2 n$ theta null point $\Rightarrow 1+g(g+1) / 2$ level 2 theta null points.
- Level $2 n \Rightarrow 1+g$ level 2 theta functions.
- Decompression: $n^{g}$ differential additions.


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## Pairings on abelian varieties

$E / k$ : elliptic curve.

- Weil pairing: $E[\ell] \times E[\ell] \rightarrow \mu_{\ell}$.

$$
P, Q \in E[\ell] . \exists f_{\ell, P} \in k(E),\left(f_{\ell, P}\right)=\ell\left(P-0_{E}\right) .
$$

$$
e_{W, \ell}(P, Q)=\frac{f_{\ell, P}\left(Q-0_{E}\right)}{f_{\ell, Q}\left(P-0_{E}\right)} .
$$

- Tate pairing: $e_{T, \ell}(P, Q)=f_{\ell, P}\left(Q-0_{E}\right)$.
- Miller algorithm: pairing with Mumford coordinates.


## The Weil and Tate pairing with theta coordinates [L Riob]

$P$ and $Q$ points of $\ell$-torsion.

| $0_{A}$ | $P$ | $2 P$ | $\cdots$ | $\ell P=\lambda_{P}^{0} 0_{A}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $Q$ | $P \oplus Q$ | $2 P+Q$ | $\ldots$ | $\ell P+Q=\lambda_{P}^{1} Q$ |
| $2 Q$ | $P+2 Q$ |  |  |  |
| $\ldots$ | $\cdots$ |  |  |  |
| $\ell Q=\lambda_{Q}^{0} 0_{A}$ | $P+\ell Q=\lambda_{Q}^{1} P$ |  |  |  |

- $e_{W, \ell}(P, Q)=\frac{\lambda_{p}^{1} \lambda_{Q}^{0}}{\lambda_{P}^{1} \lambda_{Q}^{1}}$.
- $e_{T, \ell}(P, Q)=\frac{\lambda_{p}^{1}}{\lambda_{p}^{0}}$.


## Comparison with Miller algorithm

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
g=1 & 7 \mathbf{M}+7 \mathbf{S}+2 \mathbf{m}_{\mathbf{0}} \\
g=2 & 17 \mathbf{M}+13 \mathbf{S}+6 \mathbf{m}_{\mathbf{0}} \\
\hline
\end{array}
$$

Tate pairing with theta coordinates, $P, Q \in A[\ell]\left(\mathbb{F}_{q^{d}}\right)$ (one step)

|  |  | Miller |  | Theta coordinates |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Doubling | Addition | One step |
| $g=1$ | $d$ even | $1 \mathbf{M}+1 \mathbf{S}+1 \mathbf{m}$ | $1 \mathbf{M}+1 \mathbf{m}$ | $1 \mathbf{M}+2 \mathbf{S}+2 \mathbf{m}$ |
|  | $d$ odd | $2 \mathbf{M}+2 \mathbf{S}+1 \mathbf{m}$ | $2 \mathbf{M}+1 \mathbf{m}$ |  |
| $g=2$ | Q degenerate + <br> denominator elimination <br>  <br>  <br> General case | $1 \mathbf{M}+1 \mathbf{S}+3 \mathbf{m}$ | $1 \mathbf{M}+3 \mathbf{m}$ | $3 \mathbf{M}+4 \mathbf{S}+4 \mathbf{m}$ |

$$
\left.P \in A[\ell]\left(\mathbb{F}_{q}\right), Q \in A[\ell]\left(\mathbb{F}_{q^{d}}\right) \text { (counting only operations in } \mathbb{F}_{q^{d}}\right) .
$$

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## The isogeny theorem

## Theorem

- Let $\ell \wedge n=1$, and $\phi: Z(\bar{n}) \rightarrow Z(\overline{\ell n}), x \mapsto \ell . x$ be the canonical embedding. Let $K_{0}=A[\ell]_{2} \subset A[\ell n]_{2}$.
- Let $\left(\vartheta_{i}^{A}\right)_{i \in Z(\overline{\ell n})}$ be the theta functions of level 误 on $A=\mathbb{C}^{g} /\left(\mathbb{Z}^{g}+\Omega \mathbb{Z}^{g}\right)$.
- Let $\left(\vartheta_{i}^{B}\right)_{i \in Z(\bar{n})}$ be the theta functions of level $n$ of $B=A / K_{0}=\mathbb{C}^{g} /\left(\mathbb{Z}^{g}+\frac{\Omega}{\ell} \mathbb{Z}^{g}\right)$.
- We have:

$$
\left(\vartheta_{i}^{B}(x)\right)_{i \in Z(\bar{n})}=\left(\vartheta_{\phi(i)}^{A}(x)\right)_{i \in Z(\bar{n})}
$$

## Example

$\pi:\left(x_{0}, x_{1}, x_{2}, x_{3}, x_{4}, x_{5}, x_{6}, x_{7}, x_{8}, x_{9}, x_{10}, x_{11}\right) \mapsto\left(x_{0}, x_{3}, x_{6}, x_{9}\right)$ is a 3-isogeny between elliptic curves.

## The modular space of theta null points of level $n(\operatorname{car} k+n)$

## Definition

The modular space $\mathcal{M}_{\bar{n}}$ of theta null points is:

$$
\sum_{t \in Z(\overline{2})} a_{x+t} a_{y+t} \sum_{t \in Z(\overline{2})} a_{u+t} a_{v+t}=\sum_{t \in Z(\overline{2})} a_{x^{\prime}+t} a_{y^{\prime}+t} \sum_{t \in Z(\overline{2})} a_{u^{\prime}+t} a_{v^{\prime}+t}
$$

with the relations of symmetry $a_{x}=a_{-x}$.

- Abelian varieties with a $n$-structure $=$ open locus of $\mathcal{M}_{\bar{n}}$.


## Isogenies and modular correspondence [FL Ro9]

| $A_{k}, A_{k}[\ell n]=A_{k}[\ell n]_{1} \oplus A_{k}[\ell n]_{2}$ |  | determines | $\left(a_{i}\right)_{i \in Z(\overline{\ell n})}$ | $\in \mathcal{M}_{\overline{\ell_{n}}}(k)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\widehat{\pi}$ | $\pi$ |  |  | $\phi_{1}$ |
|  | k, $B_{k}[n]=B_{k}[n]_{1} \oplus B_{k}[n]_{2}$ |  | $\left(b_{i}\right)_{i \in Z(\bar{n})}$ | $\in \mathcal{M}_{\bar{n}}(k)$ |

- Every isogeny (with isotropic kernel $K$ ) comes from a modular solution.
- We can detect degenerate solutions.


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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\pi$ | $\pi$ |  | $\phi_{1}$ |
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## The contragredient isogeny [L Rioa]



Let $\pi: A \rightarrow B$ be the isogeny associated to $\left(a_{i}\right)_{i \in Z\left(\overline{\ell_{n}}\right)}$. Let $y \in B$ and $x \in A$ be one of the $\ell^{g}$ antecedents. Then

$$
\widehat{\pi}(y)=\ell \cdot x
$$

## The contragredient isogeny [L Rioa]

| [ $\ell]$ |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| $x \in A \longrightarrow z \in A$ | Let $\pi: A \rightarrow B$ be the isogeny associated to |
|  | $\left(a_{i}\right)_{i \in Z\left(\overline{e_{n}}\right)}$. Let $y \in B$ and $x \in A$ be one of the $\ell 9$ antecedents. Then |
| $\prime \in$ |  |
| $y \in B$ | $\widehat{\pi}(y)=\ell . x$ |

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$$
\widehat{\pi}(y)=\ell \cdot x
$$

## Explicit isogenies algorithm

- (Compressed) modular point from $K: g(g+1) / 2 e^{\text {th }}$-roots and $g(g+1) / 2 \cdot O(\log (\ell))$ chain additions.
$\Rightarrow$ (Compressed) isogeny: $g \cdot O(\log (\ell))$ chain additions.


## Example

- B: elliptic curve $y^{2}=x^{3}+23 x+3$ over $k=\mathbb{F}_{31}$
$\Rightarrow$ Theta null point of level $4:(3: 1: 18: 1) \in \mathcal{M}_{4}\left(\mathbb{F}_{31}\right)$.
- $K=\{(3: 1: 18: 1),(22: 15: 4: 1),(18: 29: 23: 1)\} \Rightarrow$ modular solution:
$\left(3, \eta^{14233}, \eta^{2317}, 1, \eta^{1324}, \eta^{5296}, 18, \eta^{5296}, \eta^{1324}, 1, \eta^{2317}, \eta^{14233}\right) \quad\left(\eta^{3}+\eta+28=0\right)$.
- $y=\left(\eta^{19406}, \eta^{19805}, \eta^{10720}, 1\right) ; \quad \widehat{\pi}(y)$ ?


## Example

$$
\begin{gathered}
R_{1}=\left(\eta^{1324}, \eta^{5296}, \eta^{2317}, \eta^{14233}\right) \quad y=\left(\eta^{19406}, \eta^{19805}, \eta^{10720}, 1\right) \\
y \oplus R_{1}=\lambda_{1}\left(\eta^{2722}, \eta^{28681}, \eta^{26466}, \eta^{2096}\right)
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## Example

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y+2 R_{1}=\lambda_{1}^{2}\left(\eta^{28758}, \eta^{11337}, \eta^{27602}, \eta^{22972}\right) \\
y+3 R_{1}=\lambda_{1}^{3}\left(\eta^{18374}, \eta^{18773}, \eta^{9688}, \eta^{28758}\right)=y / \eta^{1032} \text { so } \lambda_{1}^{3}=\eta^{28758}
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\widehat{\pi}(y)=\left(3, \eta^{21037}, \eta^{15925}, 1, \eta^{8128}, \eta^{18904}, 18, \eta^{12100}, \eta^{14932}, 1, \eta^{9121}, \eta^{27841}\right)
\end{gathered}
$$

## Changing level by taking an isogeny



- $\pi_{2} \circ \widehat{\pi}: \ell^{2}$ isogeny in level $n$.
- Modular points (corresponding to $K) \Leftrightarrow A[\ell]=A[\ell]_{1} \oplus \widehat{\pi}(B[\ell])$ $\Leftrightarrow \ell^{2}$-isogenies $B \rightarrow C$.
- Isogeny graphs: $B[\ell] \Rightarrow \ell^{2 g}$ differential additions.


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## Changing level without taking isogenies

## Theorem (Koizumi-Kempf)

- Let $\mathcal{L}$ be the space of theta functions of level $\ell n$ and $\mathcal{L}^{\prime}$ the space of theta functions of level $n$.
- Let $F \in \mathrm{M}_{r}(\mathbb{Z})$ be such that ${ }^{t} F F=\ell \mathrm{Id}$, and $f: A^{r} \rightarrow A^{r}$ the corresponding isogeny. We have $\mathcal{L}=f^{*} \mathcal{L}^{\prime}$ and the isogeny $f$ is given by

$$
f^{*}\left(\vartheta_{i_{1}}^{\mathcal{L}^{\prime}} \star \ldots \star \vartheta_{\substack{i_{r} \\\left(j_{1}, \ldots, j_{r}\right) \in K_{1}\left(\mathcal{L}^{\prime}\right) \times \ldots \times K_{1}\left(\mathcal{L}^{\prime}\right) \\ f\left(j_{1}, \ldots, j_{r}\right)=\left(i_{1}, \ldots, i_{r}\right)}} \vartheta_{\substack{\mathcal{L}}}^{\mathcal{L}} \star \ldots \vartheta_{j_{r}}^{\mathcal{L}}\right.
$$

- $F=\left(\begin{array}{cc}1 & -1 \\ -1 & 1\end{array}\right)$ gives the Riemann relations. (For general $\ell$, use the quaternions.) $\Rightarrow$ Go up and down in level without taking isogenies [Cosset +R ].


## $\mathcal{A}$ complete generalisation of Velu's algorithm [Cosset $+\mathcal{R}$ ]

- Compute the isogeny $B \rightarrow A$ while staying in level $n$.
- No need of $\ell$-roots. Need only $O(\# K)$ differential additions in $B$ $+O\left(\ell^{g}\right)$ or $O\left(\ell^{2 g}\right)$ multiplications $\Rightarrow$ fast.
- The formulas are rational if the kernel $K$ is rational.
- Blocking part: compute $K \Rightarrow$ compute all the $\ell$-torsion on $B$. $g=2$ : $\ell$-torsion, $\widetilde{O}\left(\ell^{6}\right)$ vs $O\left(\ell^{2}\right)$ for the isogeny.
$\Rightarrow$ Work in level 2.
$\Rightarrow$ Convert back and forth to Mumford coordinates:



## Example

The Igusa $j$-invariants $(3908,2195,648)$ correspond to an hyperelliptic curve over $\mathbb{F}_{4217}$ 1069-isogeneous to itself.

## Outline

## (1) Public-key cryptography

2 Abelian varieties
(3) Theta functions

4 Pairings
(5) Isogenies
(6) Perspectives

## An improved modular correspondence?



- $\# B_{k}[\ell]=\ell^{2 g}$.
- Isotropic subspaces: $O\left(\ell^{g(g+1) / 2}\right)$.
- Modular solutions \# $\phi_{1}^{-1}\left(\left(b_{i}\right)_{i \in Z(\bar{n})}\right)=O\left(\ell^{2 g^{2}+g}\right)$.


## Linking theta null points and Jacobians

- Thomae formulas $\Rightarrow$ link between Jacobian of hyperelliptic curves and theta functions.
- Equivalent for non hyperelliptic curves [Sheo8]?


## Application

Extends [Smio9] attack on hyperelliptic genus 3 curves.

## Some more applications

- Explicit isogeny computation $\Rightarrow$ endomorphism ring, Hilbert class polynomials.
- Modular space in level 2 and equations for the Kummer varieties.
- Improve the algorithm [CLo8] for computing theta null points of the canonical lift of an ordinary abelian variety $\Rightarrow$ point counting in small characteristic.
- Improve the pairing algorithm (Ate pairing).
- Faster additions law (level 3 theta functions, level $(2,4)$ in genus 2 ).
- Characteristic 2 [GLog].


Thank you for your attention!

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