

CompCertX:

Verified Separate Compilation for
Compositional Verification of Layered Systems

Yale



Reservoir Labs



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Jérémie Koenig

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Tahina Ramananandro

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Yu Guo




August 24, 2015

Motivation

*How to build reliable & secure **system software stacks**?*

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



Motivation

Android architecture & system stack


From https://thenewcircle.com/s/post/1031/android_stack_source_to_device &

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_\(operating_system\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_(operating_system))



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
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
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Web Application Development Stack

<http://www.brightware.co.uk/Technology.aspx>



Motivation (cont'd)



- Common themes: all system stacks are built based on **abstraction**, **modularity**, and **layering**
- **Abstraction layers** are ubiquitous!

Motivation (cont'd)

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- **Abstraction layers** are ubiquitous!

Such use of abstraction, modularity, and layering is “**the key factor that drove the computer industry toward today's explosive levels of innovation and growth** because *complex products can be built from smaller subsystems that can be designed independently yet function together as a whole.*”

Baldwin & Clark “Design Rules: Volume 1, The Power of Modularity”, MIT Press, 2000



Problems

- What is an ***abstraction layer***?
- How to formally ***specify*** an abstraction layer?
- How to ***program***, ***verify***, and ***compile*** each layer?
- How to ***compose*** abstraction layers?
- How to apply ***certified abstraction layers*** to build ***reliable*** and ***secure*** system software?



Our Contributions



- We introduce **deep specification** and present a language-based formalization of **certified abstraction layer**
- We developed new languages & tools in Coq
 - **A formal layer calculus** for composing certified layers
 - **ClightX** for writing certified layers in a C-like language
 - **AsmX** for writing certified layers in assembly
 - **CompCertX** that compiles **ClightX** layers into **AsmX** layers
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Example: Thread Queues

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extern unsigned int dequeue(unsigned int);
extern void set_state(unsigned int, unsigned int);
extern void enqueue(unsigned int, unsigned int);

void thread_enqueue(unsigned int proc_index)
{
    set_state(proc_index, TSTATE_READY);
    enqueue(NUM_CHAN, proc_index);
}

void thread_wakeup(unsigned int chan_index)
{
    unsigned int proc_index;
    proc_index = dequeue(chan_index);
    if(proc_index != NUM_PROC)
        thread_enqueue(proc_index);
}
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} Layer primitives

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Abs-
State



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
Layer primitives

Client code

Abs-
State



tcbp(0) tcbp(1) tcbp(2)



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
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
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
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


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


Example: Thread Queues

Abs-
State



Concrete
Memory



What is an Abstraction Layer?

overlay
 L_2

abs-state


memory

primitives


C or Asm
module
implementation

underlay
 L_1


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
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
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
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
What is an Abstraction Layer?



Example: Page Tables

concrete C types

```
struct PMap {  
    char * page_dir[1024];  
    uint page_table[1024][1024];  
};
```



abstract Coq spec

Inductive **PTPerm**: Type :=

- | PTP
- | PTU
- | PTK.

Inductive **PTEInfo**:

- | PTEValid (v : Z) (p : **PTPerm**)
- | PTEUnPresent.

Definition **PMap** := ZMap.t **PTEInfo**.

Example: Page Tables

abstract
layer
spec

abstract state

PMap := ZMap.t PTEInfo
(* $vaddr \rightarrow (paddr, perm)$ *)

Invariants: kernel page table is
a direct map; user parts are
isolated



abstract primitives (Coq functions)

Definition page_table_init := ...
Definition page_table_insert := ...
Definition page_table_rmv := ...
Definition page_table_read := ...

concrete C
implementation

memory

```
char * page_dir[1024];  
  
uint page_table[1024][1024];
```



C functions

```
int page_table_init() { ... }  
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```

Formalizing Abstraction Layers

What is a *certified* abstraction layer


(L_1, M, L_2) ?

C or Asm
implementation

module M with
concrete state: mem


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
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
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
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Formalizing Abstraction Layers

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Compositional Verification: The “Implements” Simulation Relation

$$L_1 \vdash_R M : L_2$$

Defined as

$$L_2 \leq_R \llbracket M \rrbracket \xleftarrow{L_1}$$

compositional
per-module
semantics
 $\llbracket \bullet \rrbracket$

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$$\text{abs2} \xrightarrow{\mathcal{L}_2(f)} \text{abs2}'$$

for each function f in $\text{Dom}(\mathcal{L}_2)$


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
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
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Forward Downward Simulation:

- Whenever $\mathcal{L}_2(f)$ takes $abs2$ to $abs2'$ in one step, and $R(abs2, mem1)$ holds,
- then there exists $mem1'$ such that $\llbracket M \rrbracket(\mathcal{L}_1)(f)$ takes $mem1$ to $mem1'$ in zero or more steps, and $R(abs2', mem1')$ also holds.


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
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Deep Specification and Contextual Refinement

Our ultimate goal:

Making refinement “contextual” using
the whole-program semantics $\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket$

$$L_1 \models_R M : L_2$$



L_2 is a **deep specification** of M over L_1

if under any **valid** program context P of L_2 ,

$\llbracket P \oplus M \rrbracket (L_1)$ and $\llbracket P \rrbracket (L_2)$ are
observationally equivalent

L_2 captures everything about running M over L_1

Soundness


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


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
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
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Contextualize

$$\begin{aligned} & \forall \text{ valid } P : \\ & \llbracket P \rrbracket (L_2) \leq_R \llbracket P \oplus M \rrbracket (L_1) \end{aligned}$$

Reversing the Simulation Relation

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$$L_2 \leq_R \llbracket M \rrbracket L_1$$


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
If $\forall \text{ valid } P : \llbracket P \oplus M \rrbracket (L_1)$ is *deterministic*
relative to external events
(*a la CompCert*)

$$\forall \text{ valid } P : \\ \llbracket P \oplus M \rrbracket (L_1) \leq_R \llbracket P \rrbracket (L_2)$$

Reversing the Simulation Relation




Why Deep Spec is Really Cool?



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Deep spec L_2 captures all we need to know about a layer M

- No need to ever look at M again!
- Any property about M can be proved using L_2 alone.

Implementation Independence : any two implementations of the same deep spec are *contextually equivalent*




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Coq


Coq




What We Have Done




What We Have Done




What We Have Done




What We Have Done




What We Have Done




What We Have Done




What We Have Done



What We Have Done




What We Have Done




Example: Thread Queues

Abs-
State



Concrete
Memory



Example: Thread Queues

L_1

Abs-
State

1

:: 0

:: 2

:: nil



tcbp(0)

tcbp(1)

tcbp(2)

Ready

Ready

Ready

$$L_0 \vdash_R M : L_1$$

L_0

Concrete
Memory

tcbp[0]

tcbp[1]

tcbp[2]

Ready

Ready

head

tail

Ready




Example: Thread Queues

L_1

High Abs-State




$tcbp(0)$ $tcbp(1)$ $tcbp(2)$



$L_{0.5}$

Low Abs-State


$tcbp(0)$



$tcbp(1)$ head




$tcbp(2)$ tail



M

Concrete Memory

$tcbp[0]$




$tcbp[1]$ head

Ready

$tcbp[2]$ tail

Ready

LayerLib: Vertical Composition



$$\frac{L_1 \vdash_R M : L_2 \quad L_2 \vdash_S N : L_3}{L_1 \vdash_{R \circ S} M \oplus N : L_3} \text{ VCOMP}$$

Example: Thread Queues

L_1

**High
Abs-
State**



$L_{0.5}$

**Low
Abs-
State**


M

L_0

**Concrete
Memory**



Example: Thread Queues



Example: Thread Queues

C Implementation

```
typedef enum {  
    TD_READY, TD_RUN,  
    TD_SLEEP, TD_DEAD  
} td_state;
```

Low Layer Spec in Coq

```
Inductive td_state :=  
| TD_READY | TD_RUN  
| TD_SLEEP | TD_DEAD.
```

High Layer Spec in Coq

```
Inductive td_state :=  
| TD_READY | TD_RUN  
| TD_SLEEP | TD_DEAD.
```

Example: Thread Queues

C Implementation

```
typedef enum {  
    TD_READY, TD_RUN,  
    TD_SLEEP, TD_DEAD  
} td_state;  
  
struct tcb {  
    td_state tds;  
    struct tcb *prev, *next;  
};
```

Low Layer Spec in Coq

```
Inductive td_state :=  
| TD_READY | TD_RUN  
| TD_SLEEP | TD_DEAD.  
  
Record tcb := TCBV {  
    tds : td_state;  
    prev : Z; next : Z  
}
```

High Layer Spec in Coq

```
Inductive td_state :=  
| TD_READY | TD_RUN  
| TD_SLEEP | TD_DEAD.  
  
Definition tcb := td_state.
```

Example: Thread Queues

C Implementation

```
typedef enum {
    TD_READY, TD_RUN,
    TD_SLEEP, TD_DEAD
} td_state;

struct tcb {
    td_state tds;
    struct tcb *prev, *next;
};

struct tdq {
    struct tcb *head, *tail;
};
```

Low Layer Spec in Coq

```
Inductive td_state :=
| TD_READY | TD_RUN
| TD_SLEEP | TD_DEAD.
```

```
Record tcb := TCBV {
    tds : td_state;
    prev : Z; next : Z
}
```

```
Record tdq := TDQV {
    head: Z; tail: Z
}
```

High Layer Spec in Coq

```
Inductive td_state :=
| TD_READY | TD_RUN
| TD_SLEEP | TD_DEAD.
```

```
Definition tcb := td_state.
```

```
Definition tdq := List Z.
```

Example: Thread Queues

C Implementation

```
typedef enum {
    TD_READY, TD_RUN,
    TD_SLEEP, TD_DEAD
} td_state;

struct tcb {
    td_state tds;
    struct tcb *prev, *next;
};

struct tdq {
    struct tcb *head, *tail;
};

struct tcb tcbp[64];
struct tdq tdqp[64];
```

Low Layer Spec in Coq

```
Inductive td_state :=
| TD_READY | TD_RUN
| TD_SLEEP | TD_DEAD.
```

```
Record tcb := TCBV {
    tds : td_state;
    prev : Z; next : Z
}
```

```
Record tdq := TDQV {
    head: Z; tail: Z
}
```

```
Record abs:=ABS {
    tcbp : ZMap.t tcb;
    tdqp : ZMap.t tdq
}
```

High Layer Spec in Coq

```
Inductive td_state :=
| TD_READY | TD_RUN
| TD_SLEEP | TD_DEAD.
```

```
Definition tcb := td_state.
```

```
Definition tdq := list Z.
```

```
Record abs:=ABS {
    tcbp : ZMap.t tcb;
    tdqp : ZMap.t tdq
}
```

Example: Thread Queues

C Implementation

```
typedef enum {
    TD_READY, TD_RUN,
    TD_SLEEP, TD_DEAD
} td_state;

struct tcb {
    td_state tds;
    struct tcb *prev, *next;
};

struct tdq {
    struct tcb *head, *tail;
};

struct tcb tcbp[64];
struct tdq tdqp[64];

struct tcb * dequeue
    (struct tdq *q) {
        .....
}
```

Low Layer Spec in Coq

```
Inductive td_state :=
| TD_READY | TD_RUN
| TD_SLEEP | TD_DEAD.
```

```
Record tcb := TCBV {
    tds : td_state;
    prev : Z; next : Z
}
```

```
Record tdq := TDQV {
    head: Z; tail: Z
}
```

```
Record abs:=ABS {
    tcbp : ZMap.t tcb;
    tdqp : ZMap.t tdq
}
```

```
Definition dequeue
    (d : abs) (i : Z) :=
.....
```

High Layer Spec in Coq

```
Inductive td_state :=
| TD_READY | TD_RUN
| TD_SLEEP | TD_DEAD.
```


```
Definition tcb := td_state.
```

```
Definition tdq := list Z.
```


```
Record abs := ABS {
    tcbp : ZMap.t tcb;
    tdqp : ZMap.t tdq
}
```

```
Definition dequeue
    (d : abs) (i : Z) :=
match (d.tdqp i) with
| h :: q' =>
    Some(set_tdq d i q', h)
| nil => None
end
```


Example: Dequeue




Example: Dequeue



Example: Dequeue



Example: Dequeue





Our Contributions



- We introduce **deep specification** and present a language-based formalization of **certified abstraction layer**
- We developed new languages & tools in Coq
 - A **formal layer calculus** for composing certified layers
 - **ClightX** for writing certified layers in a C-like language
 - **AsmX** for writing certified layers in assembly
 - **CompCertX** that compiles **ClightX** layers into **AsmX** layers
- We built multiple **certified OS kernels** in Coq
 - **mCertiKOS-hyper** consists of 37 layers, took less than **one-person-year** to develop, and can boot **Linux** as a guest

From CompCert 2.3 to CompCertX

- Clight to ClightX, Asm to AsmX
 - Parameterize over layer specifications
 - Per-module semantics
- Compilation passes
 - Allow function arguments, etc.
- Summary of changes :
 - 420 lines changed (out of ~120k) due to parameterization
 - 7k new lines due to per-module semantics



Our Contributions



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 -
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 -
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 - **mCertiKOS-hyper** consists of 37 layers, took less than **one-person-year** to develop, and can boot **Linux** as a guest

ClightX

- Same syntax as CompCert 2.3 Clight
- Semantics :
 - Parameterized over external function calls
 - Made per-function instead of whole-machine

CompCert Clight: external function calls

```
Inductive step: state → trace → state → Prop :=
| ...
| step_external_function: forall ef targs tres vargs k m vres t m',
  external_call ef ge vargs m t vres m' →
  step (Callstate (External ef targs tres) vargs k m)
        t (Returnstate vres k m')
| ...
```

CompCert Clight: external function calls

```
Definition extcall_sem: Type :=  
  forall (F V: Type), Genv.t F V → list val → mem → trace → val → mem → Prop.
```

```
Definition external_call (ef: external_function): extcall_sem :=  
  match ef with  
  | EF_external name sg ⇒ external_functions_sem name sg  
  | ...  
  end
```

```
Inductive step: state → trace → state → Prop :=  
| ...  
| step_external_function: forall ef targs tres vargs k m vres t m',  
  external_call ef ge vargs m t vres m' →  
  step (Callstate (External ef targs tres) vargs k m)  
    t (Returnstate vres k m')  
| ...
```

CompCert Clight: external function calls

```
Definition extcall_sem: Type :=  
  forall (F V: Type), Genv.t F V → list val → mem → trace → val → mem → Prop.
```

Axiom `external_functions_sem: ident → signature → extcall_sem.`

```
Definition external_call (ef: external_function): extcall_sem :=  
  match ef with  
  | EF_external name sg ⇒ external_functions_sem name sg  
  | ...  
  end
```

```
Inductive step: state → trace → state → Prop :=  
| ...  
| step_external_function: forall ef targs tres vars k m vres t m',  
  external_call ef ge vars m t vres m' →  
  step (Callstate (External ef targs tres) vars k m)  
    t (Returnstate vres k m')  
| ...
```

ClightX: parameterization over primitives

```
Definition extcall_sem: Type :=  
  forall (F V: Type), Genv.t F V → list val → mem → trace → val → mem → Prop.
```

```
Class ExtCallOps := {  
  external_call (ef: external_function): extcall_sem  
}.
```

```
Inductive step {ec_ops: ExtCallOps}: state → trace → state → Prop :=  
| ...  
| step_external_function: forall ef targs tres vars k m vres t m',  
  external_call ef ge vars m t vres m' →  
  step (Callstate (External ef targs tres) vars k m)  
    t (Returnstate vres k m')  
| ...
```

ClightX: parameterization

```
Definition extcall_sem: Type :=  
  forall (F V: Type), Genv.t F V → list val → mem → trace → val → mem → Prop.
```

```
Class ExtCallOps := {  
  external_call (ef: external_function): extcall_sem  
}.
```

Where is the abstract state ?

```
Inductive step {ec_ops: ExtCallOps}: state → trace → state → Prop :=  
| ...  
| step_external_function: forall ef targs tres vars k m vres t m',  
  external_call ef ge vars m t vres m' →  
  step (Callstate (External ef targs tres) vars k m)  
    t (Returnstate vres k m')  
| ...
```

ClightX: parameterization

```
Definition extcall_sem: Type :=  
  forall (F V: Type), Genv.t F V → list val → mem → trace → val → mem → Prop.
```

```
Class ExtCallOps := {  
  external_call (ef: external_function): extcall_sem  
}.
```

Here *fits* the abstract state !

```
Inductive step {ec_ops: ExtCallOps}: state → trace → state → Prop :=  
| ...  
| step_external_function: forall ef targs tres vars k m vres t m',  
  external_call ef ge vars m t vres m' →  
  step (Callstate (External ef targs tres) vars k m)  
    t (Returnstate vres k m')  
| ...
```

CompCertX: memory model

```
Class MemoryOps (mem: Type) := {  
    load:    memory_chunk → mem → block → Z → option val;  
    store:   memory_chunk → mem → block → Z → val → option mem;  
    ...  
}
```

CompCertX: memory model

```
Class MemoryOps (mem: Type) := {  
    load:    memory_chunk → mem → block → Z → option val;  
    store:   memory_chunk → mem → block → Z → val → option mem;  
    ...  
}
```

```
Instance compcert_mem: MemoryOps compcert.common.Memory.mem := ...
```

CompCertX: memory model

```
Class MemoryOps (mem: Type) := {  
    load:    memory_chunk → mem → block → Z → option val;  
    store:   memory_chunk → mem → block → Z → val → option mem;  
    ...  
}
```

```
Definition extcall_sem {mem: Type} {mem_ops: MemoryOps mem}: Type :=  
  forall (F V: Type), Genv.t F V → list val → mem → trace → val → mem → Prop.
```

CompCertX: memory model

```
Class MemoryOps (mem: Type) := {  
    load:   memory_chunk → mem → block → Z → option val;  
    store:  memory_chunk → mem → block → Z → val → option mem;  
    ...  
}
```

```
Definition extcall_sem {mem: Type} {mem_ops: MemoryOps mem}: Type :=  
  forall (F V: Type), Genv.t F V → list val → mem → trace → val → mem → Prop.
```

And that's all !
CompCertX itself knows nothing
about the abstract state...

Memory model and abstract state

```
Class MemoryOps (mem: Type) := {  
    load:    memory_chunk → mem → block → Z → option val;  
    store:   memory_chunk → mem → block → Z → val → option mem;  
    ...  
}  
  
Class AbstractStateOps (data mwd: Type) := {  
    get_abstract_data: mwd → data;  
    put_abstract_data: data → mwd → data;  
    ...  
}
```

Memory model and abstract state

```
Class MemoryOps (mem: Type) := {  
    load:    memory_chunk → mem → block → Z → option val;  
    store:   memory_chunk → mem → block → Z → val → option mem;  
    ...  
}
```

```
Class AbstractStateOps (data mwd: Type) := {  
    get_abstract_data: mwd → data;  
    put_abstract_data: data → mwd → data;  
    ...  
}
```

```
Global Instance mem_with_data_mem:  
    forall (mem data: Type),  
        MemoryOps mem → MemoryOps (mem * data)  
:= ...
```

```
Global Instance mem_with_data_abstract_state:  
    forall (mem data: Type),  
        AbstractStateOps data (mem * data)  
:= ...
```

Lenses

CompCert Clight initial and final states

- Whole-machine semantics
- Initial state:
 - Call "main"
 - No arguments
 - Empty memory (except initialized globals)
- Final state:
 - Return an integer
 - Memory is not relevant

```
Inductive initial_state (p: program) :  
state → Prop := initial_state_intro:  
  forall b f m0,  
  let ge := Genv.globalenv p in  
  Genv.init_mem p = Some m0 →  
  Genv.find_symbol ge p.(prog_main) = Some b →  
  Genv.find_funct_ptr ge b = Some f →  
  type_of_fundef f =  
    Tfunction Tnil type_int32s cc_default →  
  initial_state p (Callstate f nil Kstop m0).
```

```
Inductive final_state:  
state → int → Prop := final_state_intro:  
  forall r m,  
  final_state (Returnstate (Vint r) Kstop m) r.
```

Clight vs. ClightX initial and final states

- Whole-machine semantics
- Initial state:
 - Call "main"
 - No arguments
 - Empty memory (except initialized globals)
- Final state:
 - Return an integer
 - Memory is not relevant
- Per-module semantics for a function *i* with arguments *args* and memory *m*
- Initial state :
 - Call the function *i*
 - With arguments *args*
 - And the memory *m*
- Final state
 - Return a value
 - Memory is relevant

ClightX initial and final states

- Per-function semantics for a function i with arguments $args$ and memory m
- Initial state :
 - Call the function i
 - With arguments $args$
 - And the memory m
- Final state
 - Return a value
 - Memory is relevant

```
Inductive initial_state `{Memory0ps} (p: program)
(i: ident) (m: mem) (sg: signature) (args: list val):
state → Prop := initial_state_intro:
  forall b f targs tres tcc,
  Genv.find_symbol ge i = Some b →
  Genv.find_funct_ptr ge b = Some f →
  type_of_fundef f =
    Tfunction targs tres tcc →
  sg = signature_of_type targs tres tcc →
  initial_state p i m sg args
  (Callstate f args Kstop m).
```

```
Inductive final_state (sg: signature):
state → val * mem → Prop := final_state_intro:
  forall v m,
  final_state (Returnstate v Kstop m) (v, m).
```



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 -
- We developed new languages & tools in Coq
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Assembly code

- Low-level stack management
 - Context switching
 - Process creation
- ~200 lines of CertiKOS (out of >5k)

```
kctxt_switch:  
    leal  0(%eax,%eax,2), %eax  
    leal  KCtxtPool_LOC(%eax,8), %eax  
    movl  %esp, 0(%eax)  
    movl  %edi, 4(%eax)  
    movl  %esi, 8(%eax)  
    movl  %ebx, 12(%eax)  
    movl  %ebp, 16(%eax)  
    popl  %ecx  
    movl  %ecx, 20(%eax)  
    leal  0(%edx,%edx,2), %edx  
    leal  KCtxtPool_LOC(%edx,8), %edx  
    movl  0(%edx), %esp  
    movl  4(%edx), %edi  
    movl  8(%edx), %esi  
    movl  12(%edx), %ebx  
    movl  16(%edx), %ebp  
    movl  20(%edx), %ecx  
    pushl %ecx  
    xorl  %eax, %eax  
    ret
```

AsmX: Layer primitives

- Support for two kinds of primitives:
 - C-style primitives with arguments and calling convention
 - assembly primitives with full register set
(a la CompCert built-ins)

CompCert x86 Asm external function calls

- External functions + calling convention

```
Inductive external_call'
  (ef: external_function) (ge: Genv.t)
  (vargs: list val) (m1: mem) (t: trace) (vres: list val) (m2: mem) : Prop :=
external_call'_intro: forall v,
  external_call ef ge (decode_longs (sig_args (ef_sig ef)) vargs) m1 t v m2 →
  vres = encode_long (sig_res (ef_sig ef)) v →
  external_call' ef ge vargs m1 t vres m2.
```

```
Inductive step (ge: genv): state -> trace -> state -> Prop :=
| ...
| exec_step_external:
  forall b ef args res rs m t rs' m',
  rs PC = Vptr b Int.zero →
  Genv.find_funct_ptr ge b = Some (External ef) →
  extcall_arguments rs m (ef_sig ef) args →
  external_call' ef ge args m t res m' →
  rs' = (set_regs (loc_external_result (ef_sig ef)) res (rs #PC ← (rs RA) #RA ← Vundef) →
  step ge (State rs m) t (State rs' m')
| ...
```

AsmX external function calls

- C-style externals

```
Inductive step {eco: ExtCallOps}                                (ge: genv):  
  state -> trace -> state -> Prop :=  
| ...  
| exec_step_external:  
|   forall b ef args res rs m t rs' m',  
|     rs PC = Vptr b Int.zero →  
|     Genv.find_funct_ptr ge b = Some (External ef) →  
|     extcall_arguments rs m (ef_sig ef) args →  
|     external_call' ef ge args m t res m' →  
|     rs' = (set_regs (loc_external_result (ef_sig ef)) res (rs #PC ← (rs RA) #RA ← Vundef) →  
|       step ge (State rs m) t (State rs' m')  
| ...
```

AsmX external function calls

- C-style externals + assembly-style primitives

```
Definition primcall_sem {mem: Type} {mem_ops: MemoryOps mem}: Type :=  
  Asm.genv → regset → mem → trace → regset → mem → Prop.  
  
Class PrimCallOps := {  
  primitive_call (ef: external_function): primcall_sem  
}.  
Inductive step {eco: ExtCallOps} {pco: PrimCallOps} (ge: genv):  
  state -> trace -> state -> Prop :=  
| ...  
| exec_step_external:  
  forall b ef args res rs m t rs' m',  
    rs PC = Vptr b Int.zero →  
    Genv.find_funct_ptr ge b = Some (External ef) →  
    extcall_arguments rs m (ef_sig ef) args →  
    external_call' ef ge args m t res m' →  
    rs' = (set_regs (loc_external_result (ef_sig ef)) res (rs #PC ← (rs RA) #RA ← Vundef) →  
    step ge (State rs m) t (State rs' m')  
| exec_step_primitive:  
  forall b ef rs m t rs' m',  
    rs PC = Vptr b Int.zero →  
    Genv.find_funct_ptr ge b = Some (External ef) →  
    primitive_call ef ge rs m t rs' m' →  
    step ge (State rs m) t (State rs' m')  
| ...
```

AsmX external function calls

- C-style externals + assembly-style primitives

```
Definition primcall_sem {mem: Type} {mem_ops: MemoryOps mem}: Type :=  
  Asm.genv → regset → mem → trace → regset → mem → Prop.  
  
Class PrimCallOps := {  
  primitive_call (ef: external_function): primcall_sem  
}.
```

```
Inductive step {eco: ExtCallOps} {pco: PrimCallOps} (ge: genv):  
  state -> trace -> state -> Prop :=  
| ...  
| exec_step_external:  
  forall b ef args res rs m t rs' m',  
    rs PC = Vptr b Int.zero →  
    Genv.find_funct_ptr ge b = Some (External ef) →  
    extcall_arguments rs m (ef_sig ef) args →  
    external_call' ef ge args m t res m' →  
    rs' = (set_regs (loc_external_result (ef_sig ef)) res (rs #PC ← (rs RA) #RA ← Vundef) →  
    step ge (State rs m) t (State rs' m')  
| exec_step_primitive:  
  forall b ef rs m t rs' m',  
    rs PC = Vptr b Int.zero →  
    Genv.find_funct_ptr ge b = Some (External ef) →  
    primitive_call ef ge rs m t rs' m' →  
    step ge (State rs m) t (State rs' m')  
| ...
```

Keep both rules
to avoid distinguishing between
C layers and assembly layers

CompCert Asm initial and final states

- CompCert x86 Asm Whole-Program Semantics
- Initial state :
 - Call main
 - Empty memory (except initialized globals)
 - Empty register set
- Final state :
 - Return an integer
 - Memory and register sets are not relevant

```
Inductive initial_state (p: program): state -> Prop :=
| initial_state_intro: forall m0,
  Genv.init_mem p = Some m0 ->
  let ge := Genv.globalenv p in
  let rs0 := (Pregmap.init Vundef)
  # PC <- (symbol_offset ge p.(prog_main) Int.zero)
  # RA <- Vzero
  # ESP <- Vzero in
  initial_state p (State rs0 m0).

Inductive final_state: state -> int -> Prop :=
| final_state_intro: forall rs m r,
  rs#PC = Vzero ->
  rs#EAX = Vint r ->
  final_state (State rs m) r.
```

Asm vs. AsmX initial and final states

- CompCert x86 Asm Whole-Program Semantics
- Initial state :
 - Call main
 - Empty memory (except initialized globals)
 - Empty register set
- Final state :
 - Return an integer
 - Memory and register sets are not relevant
- AsmX per-module semantics for function i with register set rs and memory m
 - Initial state
 - Call function i
 - With memory m
 - And register set rs
 - Final state
 - Return a list of 32-bit values
 - Memory and register sets are relevant
- Function semantics can use :
 - C-style pattern with arguments and calling convention for CompCertX
 - Assembly-style pattern with no return values for the layer language
 - Whole memory and register set are relevant in both cases


AsmX initial and final states (C-style pattern)

- AsmX per-module semantics for function i with arguments $args$, register set rs and memory m
 - Initial state
 - Call function i
 - With arguments $args$
 - With memory m
 - And register set rs
 - Final state
 - Return a list of 32-bit values
 - Memory and register sets are relevant
 - Embed the C calling convention


```
Inductive initial_state (rs: regset) (p: Asm.program)
(i: ident) (sg: signature) (args: list val) (m: mem):
state -> Prop :=
| initial_state'_intro: forall
  b
  (Hb: Genv.find_symbol (Genv.globalenv p) i = Some b)
  (Hpc: rs PC = Vptr b Int.zero)
  (Hargs: extcall_arguments rs m sg args),
  initial_state rs p i sg args m (State lm m).

Inductive final_state (rs0: regset) (sg: signature) : state ->
(list val * mem) -> Prop :=
| final_state_intro:
  forall rs,
    (rs0 # RA) = (rs # PC) ->
    (rs0 # ESP) = (rs # ESP) ->
    forall v,
      v = List.map rs (loc_external_result sg) ->
    forall
      (CALLEE_SAVE:
        forall r,
        ~ In r destroyed_at_call ->
        Val.lessdef (rs0 (preg_of r)) (rs (preg_of r))),
    forall m_,
      final_state rs0 sg (State rs m_) (v, m_).
```


Functions and primitives




Functions and primitives



Functions and primitives




Functions and primitives



ClightX functions can
call C-style primitives
implemented in AsmX

Functions and primitives





Mumbai, India

January 12-18

Our Contributions



- We introduce **deep specification** and present a language-based formalization of **certified abstraction layer**
- We developed new languages & tools in Coq
 - A **formal layer calculus** for composing/linking certified layers
 - **ClightX** for writing certified layers in a C-like language
 - **AsmX** for writing certified layers in assembly
 - **CompCertX** that compiles **ClightX** layers into **AsmX** layers
- We built multiple **certified OS kernels** in Coq
 - mCertiKOS-hyper consists of 37 layers, took less than **one-person-year** to develop, and can boot **Linux** as a guest

Programming & Compiling Layers

ClightX

$L \vdash_R M_c : L_1$



$L_1 \leq_R \llbracket M_c \rrbracket_{\text{ClightX}}(L)$

Programming & Compiling Layers

ClightX

$$L \vdash_R M_c : L_1 \rightarrow$$

$$L_1 \leq_R \llbracket M_c \rrbracket_{\text{ClightX}}(L)$$



CompCertX correctness theorem (where *minj* is a memory injection)

$$\llbracket M_c \rrbracket_{\text{ClightX}}(L) \leq_{\text{minj}} \llbracket \text{CompCertX}[L](M_c) \rrbracket_{\text{AsmX}}(L)$$

Programming & Compiling Layers

ClightX

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$$L_1 \leq_{R \circ \text{minj}}$$

$$\llbracket \text{CompCertX}[L](M_c) \rrbracket_{\text{AsmX}}(L)$$

Programming & Compiling Layers

ClightX

$$L \vdash_R M_c : L_1 \rightarrow$$

$$L_1 \leq_R \llbracket M_c \rrbracket_{\text{ClightX}}(L)$$



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$$\llbracket M_c \rrbracket_{\text{ClightX}}(L) \leq_{\mathit{minj}} \llbracket \text{CompCertX}[L](M_c) \rrbracket_{\text{AsmX}}(L)$$



$$L_1 \leq_{R \circ \mathit{minj}} \llbracket \text{CompCertX}[L](M_c) \rrbracket_{\text{AsmX}}(L)$$



R must absorb such memory injection: $R \circ \mathit{minj} = R$ then we have:

$$L_1 \leq_R \llbracket \text{CompCertX}[L](M_c) \rrbracket_{\text{AsmX}}(L)$$

Programming & Compiling Layers

ClightX

$$L \vdash_R M_c : L_1$$

$$L_1 \leq_R \llbracket M_c \rrbracket_{\text{ClightX}}(L)$$



CompCertX correctness theorem (where minj is a memory injection)

$$\llbracket M_c \rrbracket_{\text{ClightX}}(L) \leq_{\text{minj}} \llbracket \text{CompCertX}[L](M_c) \rrbracket_{\text{AsmX}}(L)$$



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$$L_1 \leq_R \llbracket \text{CompCertX}[L](M_c) \rrbracket_{\text{AsmX}}(L)$$



Let $M_a = \text{CompCertX}[L](M_c)$ then $L \vdash_R M_a : L_1$

AsmX

Programming & Compiling Layers

ClightX

$$L \vdash_R M_c : L_1 \rightarrow$$

$$L_1 \leq_R \llbracket M_c \rrbracket \text{ ClightX } (L)$$



CompCertX correctness theorem (where *minj* is a memory injection)

$$\llbracket M_c \rrbracket \text{ ClightX } (L) \leq_{\text{minj}} \llbracket \text{CompCertX}[L](M_c) \rrbracket \text{ AsmX } (L)$$



$$L_1 \leq_{R \circ \text{minj}} \llbracket \text{CompCertX}[L](M_c) \rrbracket \text{ AsmX } (L)$$




R must absorb such memory injection: $R \circ \text{minj} = R$ then we have:

$$L_1 \leq_R \llbracket \text{CompCertX}[L](M_c) \rrbracket \text{ AsmX } (L)$$




Let $M_a = \text{CompCertX}[L](M_c)$ then $L \vdash_R M_a : L_1$ AsmX

Reminder: CompCert compilation passes




Reminder: CompCert compilation passes




**Memory
injections**


Assembly layer refinement proof




Layer refinement proof




Layer refinement proof with CompCertX




Layer refinement proof with CompCertX




CompCertX correctness statement




Example: CsharpminorX to CminorX correctness proof




Example: CsharpminorX to CminorX correctness proof



Example: CsharpminorX to CminorX correctness proof



Example: CsharpminorX to CminorX correctness proof




Requirements

- C-style layer primitives must abide by CompCert external function requirements :
 - Stability by memory injection, extension, etc.
 - Must preserve *inject-neutral* (no pointers to invalid blocks created)
- Also needed for assembly-style primitives
 - Layer refinement relation also includes a memory injection
 - Accumulates all memory injections due to calls to code compiled by CompCertX


Layer refinement and memory injections

Client AsmX code (program context) calling overlay primitives




Layer refinement and memory injections

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Layer refinement and memory injections


Client AsmX code (program context) calling overlay primitives



Client code + primitive implementations


Layer refinement and memory injections

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
Client AsmX code (program context) calling overlay primitives



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
Layer refinement and memory injections

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
Client AsmX code (program context) calling overlay primitives



Already illustrates
linking between compiled ClightX code
and AsmX program context


Client code + primitive implementations

LayerLib: Vertical Composition




$$\frac{L_1 \vdash_R M : L_2 \quad L_2 \vdash_S N : L_3}{L_1 \vdash_{R \circ S} M \oplus N : L_3} \text{ VCOMP}$$


LayerLib: Vertical Composition and Separate Compilation




LayerLib: Vertical Composition and Separate Compilation



LayerLib: Vertical Composition and Separate Compilation



LayerLib: Vertical Composition and Cross-Module Inlining




This is work in progress.

C layer refinement

Assembly
layer
refinement

LayerLib: Vertical Composition and Cross-Module Inlining



Useful if :

- N concretizes high-level data into **low-level data**
- M concretizes low-level data into memory

C layer refinement

Assembly
layer
refinement

Example : Page maps

MPTOP

idpde_init : Initialize the kernel page map to identity page map

idpde_init.c

Abstract state

MPTIntro

set_IDPTE : Access (get/set) the page map

set_IDPTE.c

MALT

Concrete in-memory representation

Example: Page Tables

MPTOP

idpde_init.c

MPTIntro

set_IDPTE

MALT

```
#define PT_PERM_PTKF 3
#define PT_PERM_PTKT 259

extern void mem_init(unsigned int);
extern void set_IDPTE(unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int);

void idpde_init(unsigned int mbi_addr)
{
    unsigned int i, j;
    unsigned int perm;
    mem_init(mbi_addr);
    for(i = 0; i < 1024; i++)
    {
        if (i < 256)
            perm = PT_PERM_PTKT;
        else if (i >= 960)
            perm = PT_PERM_PTKT;
        else
            perm = PT_PERM_PTKF;
        for(j = 0; j < 1024; j++)
        {
            set_IDPTE(i, j, perm);
        }
    }
}
```

Example: Page Tables

MPTOP

idpde_init.c

MPTIntro

set_IDPTE

MALT


```
#define PT_PERM_PTKF 3
#define PT_PERM_PTKT 259

extern void mem_init(unsigned int);
extern void set_IDPTE(unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int);


void idpde_init(unsigned int mbi_addr)
{
    unsigned int i, j;
    unsigned int perm;
    mem_init(mbi_addr);
    for(i = 0; i < 1024; i++)
    {
        if (i < 256)
            perm = PT_PERM_PTKT;
        else if (i >= 960)
            perm = PT_PERM_PTKT;
        else
            perm = PT_PERM_PTKF;
        for(j = 0; j < 1024; j++)
        {
            set_IDPTE(i, j, perm);
        }
    }
}
```

Called
1024x1024
times

Example: Page Tables




Example: Page Tables



```
extern unsigned int IDPMap_L0C[1024][1024];

void set_IDPTE
(unsigned int pde_index,
 unsigned int vadr, unsigned int perm)
{
    IDPMap_L0C[pde_index][vadr] =
    (pde_index * 1024 + vadr) * 4096 + perm;
}
```

Example: Page Tables




```
extern unsigned int IDPMap_L0C[1024][1024];

void set_IDPTE
(unsigned int pde_index,
 unsigned int vadr, unsigned int perm)
{
    IDPMap_L0C[pde_index][vadr] =
    (pde_index * 1024 + vadr) * 4096 + perm;
}
```


This function should be inlined
in idpde_init.s !

Layer Pattern 1: Getter/Setter



Hide concrete memory; replace it with Abstract State
Only the **getter** and **setter** primitives can access memory

Layer Pattern 2: AbsFun




Memory does not change
New implementation code does not access memory directly!

Refinement proof : general pattern


L_2

L_1


Refinement proof : general pattern



Refinement proof : general pattern




LayerLib: Horizontal Composition



- L_1 and L_2 must have the same abstract state

Refinement proof : general pattern



Current limitations

- Non-global caller memory blocks are read-only
 - Due to CompCert assumption in Linear-to-Mach
 - Function call arguments must be protected
 - No arguments to top-most callee
 - 2 solutions (in progress) : copy arguments ? Use permissions ?

Limitations

- CompCertX supports no callbacks
 - Functions can only call :
 - Functions of the same module
 - Primitives of the immediate layer below
 - Lower-layer primitives must be explicitly exposed in the immediate layer
 - passed through explicitly in refinement proofs
 - Enough for CertiKOS
 - Proof by example : callbacks are not needed
 - Avoid breaches of abstraction




Our Contributions




- We introduce **deep specification** and present a language-based formalization of **certified abstraction layer**
- We developed new languages & tools in Coq
 - **A formal layer calculus** for composing certified layers
 - **ClightX** for writing certified layers in a C-like language
 - **AsmX** for writing certified layers in assembly
 - **CompCertX** that compiles **ClightX** layers into **AsmX** layers
- We built multiple **certified OS kernels** in Coq
 - **mCertiKOS-hyper** consists of 37 layers, took less than **one-person-year** to develop, and can boot **Linux** as a guest


Case Study: mCertiKOS





*Single-core version of CertiKOS
(developed under DARPA CRASH &
HACMS programs), 3 kloc, can boot
Linux*




Case Study: mCertiKOS



*Single-core version of CertiKOS
(developed under DARPA CRASH & HACMS programs), 3 kloc, can boot Linux*





Case Study: mCertiKOS




*Single-core version of CertiKOS
(developed under DARPA CRASH & HACMS programs), 3 kloc, can boot Linux*


Aggressive use of abstraction over deep specs (37 layers in ClightX & AsmX)



Decomposing mCertiKOS





Decomposing mCertiKOS



Physical Memory and Virtual Memory Management (11 Layers)

Based on the abstract machine
provided by boot loader


Decomposing mCertiKOS




Physical Memory and Virtual Memory Management (11 Layers)

Based on the abstract machine provided by boot loader

Decomposing mCertiKOS (cont'd)





Decomposing mCertiKOS (cont'd)




**Thread and Process
Management
(14 Layers)**

Decomposing mCertiKOS (cont'd)




Thread and Process Management (14 Layers)

Decomposing mCertiKOS (cont'd)




Decomposing mCertiKOS (cont'd)




**Virtualization
Support
(9 Layers)**


Decomposing mCertiKOS (cont'd)




**Virtualization
Support
(9 Layers)**



Decomposing mCertiKOS (cont'd)




Decomposing mCertiKOS (cont'd)




**Syscall and Trap
Handlers
(3 Layers)**

Decomposing mCertiKOS (cont'd)



**Syscall and Trap
Handlers
(3 Layers)**

Example: Page Fault Handler



Conclusions

- Great success w. today's **system software** ... but why?
- We identify, sharpen, & **formalize** two possible ingredients
 - abstraction over **deep specs**
 - a **compositional layered** methodology
- We build new lang. & tools to make **layered programming** *rigorous & certified* --- this leads to **huge benefits**:
 - simplified design & spec; reduced proof effort; better extensibility
- They also help ***verification in the small***
 - hiding implementation details as soon as possible

Ongoing & Future Work

- CompCertX
 - Support for stack consumption (merge with QompCert, PLDI 2014)
 - Concurrency?
- Layer calculus
 - Make horizontal composition more powerful (disjoint abstract states...)
- Compositional verification of layered systems in practice
 - Automatic generation of ClightX code, layer spec and refinement proof
- CertiKOS
 - Device drivers, concurrency (multicore?), etc.
 - Publish the code!
 - Papers available at <http://flint.cs.yale.edu>