

Number theory for post-quantum cryptography

2024/02/20 — Conseil scientifique de l'Imb

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Classical public key cryptography

- One way function:
- Multiplication: $p, q \mapsto pq$, vs Factorisation
- Exponentiation in an elliptic curve: $n \mapsto n.P$, vs Discrete Logarithm

- Everybody can encrypt
- Nobody can decrypt

Classical public key cryptography

- **Trapdoor** one way function
- **Multiplication**: $p, q \mapsto pq$, vs **Factorisation**
- **Exponentiation** in an elliptic curve: $n \mapsto n.P$, vs **Discrete Logarithm**

- Everybody can encrypt
- The **secret trapdoor** allows to decrypt

Elliptic curves vs RSA

- RSA 2048 bits: ssh-rsa

```
AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQGC1c6zqJctqMRoYVWjovfPzwKGoFgv8j6y1W6f2zGbv0if
9hdw6X1u+ooI6IwkQWr9kPrM8xl9EJ/Q1ajeESPknLUHkqrVmrFFrYsyr6DKDapdAztCfT72IXy
4Fq12PzPKTFUw67vZTqEsGH2L5x0kYrWD+P/vA/+CQpwjMq9IZ7GRE2Yf6EHpcV6ifDqRSVlyGN
z/NzBDWBQNxdCORI7DG+L3tV0x0DJkqXbvW/edVo6StAiWr0b67SYrxeUMhmvLgqFWwtq9Gayt/
4bLotah081RBUqVNQr9bSaLTY0ke/sEi0eHxiXfG3Uh7fLkVWYd+mwDcyRBGRenaik6u4ZKcCCU
y7P9UXuhLnBGpzjhUu/zuqckBR4NJDx+icq37cni1S9Aa0/ftb8L2ryGRMeiy89HPYhQBPzBaif
xpQ7XA6Vvy8VhE5an9Bewv7spHtQ50xLXkAu6BJtNcIwbt601Wu6PuXDac4gnyqa1MI3XIh36oE
0NIwRrrqvig0mixl0k=
```

- ECC 256 bits: ssh-ed25519

```
AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIFQD0TtvWadRfCXTXuT2pT7E5KWJZjPH4g0JyWvmiSJm
```

- 😊 ECC: very fast and compact

- 😊 Signatures: 64B. Pairings: 32B

- ☹ ECC and RSA broken by **quantum computers** [Shor 1994]

- NIST post-quantum call (2017), further call for post-quantum signatures (2023)


Diffie-Hellmann Key Exchange

- $P \in G$ an abelian group, e.g. $G = E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ an elliptic curve
- Alice: $P_A = aP$,
- Bob: $P_B = bP$,
- Common secret key: $S = abP$.

Post-quantum Diffie-Hellman Key exchange:


- 1 Noisy version (codes, lattices)
- 2 Group action: commutative group G acting on X ($a, b \in G, P \in X$).

Key exchange on a (commutative) graph




Key exchange on a (commutative) graph

Alice starts from 'a', follows the path 001110, and get 'w'.




Key exchange on a (commutative) graph

Bob starts from 'a', follows the path 101101, and get 'l'.




Key exchange on a (commutative) graph

Alice starts from 'l', follows the path 001110, and get 'g'.




Key exchange on a (commutative) graph

The full exchange:




Key exchange on a (commutative) graph

Bigger graph (62 nodes)



Key exchange on a (commutative) graph

Even bigger graph (676 nodes)



Commutative isogeny graphs for key exchange

- Needs a graph with good mixing properties:
A path of length $O(\log N)$ gives a uniform node \Rightarrow Ramanujan/expander graph.
- The graph does not fit in memory ($N = 2^{256}$).
- Needs an algorithm taking a node as input and giving the neighbour nodes as output.

Isogeny based cryptography

- 😊 Post-quantum
- 😊 Compact keys. SQISign signatures = 177 Bytes (Lattices 666B–2420B)
- 😞 Slow. SQISign (NIST submission): Signature = 550 ms, Verification = 8 ms
- 😞 Very new field (<10 years)
- 😞 Flagship protocol SIKE (post quantum key exchange) broken in 2022.

This talk:



- Recent advances since 2022
- How to improve the efficiency of isogeny based cryptography
- SQISignHD: Signatures of 109 Bytes in 28 ms [Dartois, Leroux, R., Wesolowski 2023]

Isogeny based cryptography

Isogeny graph of elliptic curves E/\mathbb{F}_q (Graph of size $N \approx \sqrt{q}$):

$$E_1 : y^2 = x^3 + a_1x + b_1$$

$$E_2 : y^2 = x^3 + a_2x + b_2$$



Isogeny based cryptography

Ordinary (or oriented) elliptic curves E/\mathbb{F}_p [Couveignes (1997)], [Rostovtsev–Stolbunov (2006)]

- 😊 Key exchange from a commutative group action of G on X :
 $G = \text{Cl}(\text{End}(E))$, $X = \{\text{oriented elliptic curves}\}$
- 😊 Signatures, PRFs, threshold signatures, oblivious signatures...
- 😞 Hidden shift problem solvable in quantum subexponential $L(1/2)$ time for an abelian group action via Kuperberg's algorithm.

Supersingular isogeny graphs E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2} [De Feo, Jao, Plut 2011]

- 🟡 Deuring's correspondance: supersingular isogenies = ideals in non commutative quaternion algebras
- 😊 Isogeny path problem: exponential quantum security (best known algorithm in $\tilde{O}(p^{1/2})$)
- 😞 No commutative group action anymore

Isogeny based cryptography



Dimension 1 isogenies

- $E : y^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x, T = (u : _ : v) \in E[2]$
- **Isogeny:** $E \rightarrow E' = E/\langle T \rangle, (X : _ : Z) \mapsto (X(uX - vZ) : _ : Z(vX - uZ))$ of degree 2.
 $E' : y^2 = x^3 + A'x^2 + x, A' = \frac{2(v^2 - 2u^2)}{v^2}$
- Compose several isogenies of this type: isogeny of degree 2^n
- Complexity increases with the size of the largest ℓ dividing N ($O(\ell)$ for an ℓ -isogeny).
- 😊 Smooth degree isogenies: fast to compute
- ☹ General isogenies: too expensive
- ☹ **Restricted group action**
- ☹ Inefficiencies

The Break

- 2011 [De Feo, Jao, Plût]: SIDH (Supersingular Isogeny Key-Exchange)
- 2017: SIKE (Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation) submitted to NIST's PQC competition
- 2022-07-05: SIKE goes to fourth round

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- 2022-07-30: [Castricky, Decru], "An efficient key recovery attack on SIDH"
Heuristic polynomial break on a special supersingular curve, using dimension 2 isogenies
- 2022-08-08: [Maino, Martindale], "An attack on SIDH with arbitrary starting curve"
Heuristic subexponential break on any supersingular curve, using dimension 2 isogenies
- 2022-08-10: [R.], "Breaking SIDH in polynomial time"
Proven polynomial break on any supersingular curve, using dimension 2, 4 or 8 isogenies

The rise of higher dimensional isogenies

- [R. 2022] **embedding lemma**: for all $N' > N$, an N -isogeny $f : E_1 \rightarrow E_2$ can always be efficiently embedded into an N' -isogeny $F : A_1 \rightarrow A_2$ in dimension $g = 8$ (and sometimes $g = 4, g = 2$)
- Build on earlier theoretical work by [Zarhin 1975], [Kani 1997]
- Take N' smooth or even $N' = 2^n$: can now efficiently evaluate any N -isogeny by going to higher dimension (polylogarithmic time in the degree)

- 😊 Considerable flexibility
- 😊 New algorithmic tools (canonical lifts, dividing an isogeny, endomorphism rings...[R. 2022])
- 😊 [Page-R. 2023]: **Unrestricted group action**
- ☹ Algorithms for higher dimensional isogenies (of small degree) much less understood than in dimension 1

- [Lubicz, R. et al.] 15+ years of work ($O(\ell^8)$ for an ℓ -isogeny)
- AVIsogenies [Bisson, Cosset, R.]: software to compute any N -isogeny in any dimension
- [Dartois, Maino, Pope, R. 2023]: **10× speed up** for 2^n -isogenies in dimension 2.
Low level constant time Rust implementation: **40× speed-up** (400× speed up in total!)
- A 2^{126} -isogeny in dimension 2 over a field of 500 bits in 2.85 ms

Some mathematical tools

- **Moduli spaces:** Shimura varieties of PEL type, Algebraic stacks, Hilbert-Blumenthal stacks, Complex Multiplication, Compactifications
Modular forms: $\phi \in \Lambda^g \pi_* \Omega^1_{\mathcal{X}_g/A_g} = \sum_n a_n e^{2\pi i \text{Tr}(n\tau)}$, Modular correspondances:
 $\Phi_N : \overline{A}_g(N) \rightarrow \overline{A}_g \times \overline{A}_g$ (A_g : moduli of principally polarised abelian schemes)
- **Deformations:** Heat equation: $2\pi i(1 + \delta_{jk}) \frac{\partial \theta(z, \tau)}{\partial \tau_{jk}} = \frac{\partial^2 \theta(z, \tau)}{\partial z_j \partial z_k}$,
Kodaira-Spencer isomorphism: $T_{A_g} \simeq R^1 \pi_* T_{\mathcal{X}_g/A_g} \simeq \text{Lie}_{A_g}(\mathcal{X}_g) \otimes_{\mathcal{O}_{A_g}} \text{Lie}_{A_g}(\mathcal{X}_g^\vee)$,
Gauss-Manin connection: $R^n f_* \Omega_{X/S} \rightarrow \Omega_S^1 \otimes R^n f_* \Omega_{X/S}$,
Picard-Fuchs equation: $(\lambda^3 - 27) \frac{\partial^2 \omega_\lambda}{\partial \lambda^2} + 3\lambda^2 \frac{\partial \omega_\lambda}{\partial \lambda} + \lambda \omega_\lambda = 0$,
- **Lifting and reductions:** p -divisible groups $A(p)$ and their crystals $\mathbb{D}(A(p))$, Serre-Tate + Grothendieck-Messing theory, canonical lifts, Hoge-Tate decomposition, Néron models, semi-stability, semi-abelian varieties
- **Point counting and L -functions:** étale cohomology: $H_{\text{ét}}^1(A_{\overline{k}}, \mathbb{Z}_\ell) = \text{Hom}(T_\ell(A_{\overline{k}}), \mathbb{Z}_\ell)$, crystalline cohomology: $H_{\text{crys}}^1(A/W(k)) \simeq \mathbb{D}(A(p))_{W(k)}$, Monsky-Washnitzer/rigid cohomology, De Rham cohomology, Hodge filtration: $0 \rightarrow H^0(A, \Omega_{A/k}^0) \rightarrow H_{\text{dR}}^1(A) \rightarrow H^1(A, \mathcal{O}_A) \rightarrow 0$
- **Coordinates:** Heisenberg groups and representations, algebraic theta functions, Fourier-Mukai transform: $R\Phi_{P_A} : D_{\text{coh}}^b(\mathcal{O}_A) \rightarrow D_{\text{coh}}^b(\mathcal{O}_{A^\vee})$
- **Pairings:** biextensions, cubical torsors. **Curves:** hyperelliptic curves, minimal models
- **Heights:** Néron-Tate height, Faltings-Raynaud isogeny formula, intersections
- **Equivalences of categories:** Hermitian modules